It couldn’t have happened to a more deserving man. Ebrahim Raisi’s presidential career represented the worst of the Islamic Republic. As Tehran’s deputy prosecutor less than a decade after the revolution, he was a member of the so-called “death commission” that oversaw the massacre of more than 30,000 people in the summer of 1988, most of whom were members of the opposition Mojahedin-e-Khalq movement. Thousands were imprisoned and killed, often for the “crime” of distributing an opposition newspaper, or even just reading it. Few received any sort of due process.
It was a crime that sickened many even within the regime. It is perhaps some form of justice that Raisi was never able to shake the nicknames that followed: “the butcher of Tehran” or, less prosaically, Ayatollah-e ghatl-e ām (the Ayatollah of massacre). Even when he was elected to the presidency in 2021, while serving as head of the judiciary, it was with the lowest percentage of the vote in the Islamic Republic’s history.
He was also a lousy president. In a tenure marked by the systematic elevation of hardline figures at expense of moderates to key positions, the economy tanked, strafed by inflation at more than 40% while the Iranian Rial also plummeted. Then of course there were the anti-hijab protests that began in September 2022 when the country’s fetid religious police murdered 22-year-old Mahsi Amini for incorrectly wearing her hijab. The protests eventually spread to over 100 cities across Iran, during which the state murdered at least 551 people, including 68 children.
Raisi was talked about as a possible successor to Ayatollah Khamenei, who is — after years of rumours — finally dying. Already conspiracy theories are saying he was killed by rivals, notably Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, but this is nonsense. The truth is that Raisi never had a real chance. Firstly, because if Khamenei wants his son to succeed him, which he does, then that would probably happen — despite it being in total defiance of the republic’s founding principles, which rejected the dynastic principles of Iranian monarchy. But it is the fate of most revolutionary states to curdle into what they once most despised. And secondly, because no one beyond regime allies and a small percentage of religious and authoritarian headbangers actually liked Raisi. As well as the albatross of his butcher label, he was also a tedious man, lacking in any real charisma.
Of more relevance is what his death will mean for the state. Vice President Mohammad Mokhber has been named as interim president. Mokhber is part of a three-person council with the speaker of parliament and head of the judiciary that is now responsible for organising new elections for the president within 50 days. Mokhber, incidentally, was previously head of Setad — an investment fund linked to the Supreme Leader — and was sanctioned by the EU in 2010 for his involvement in “nuclear or ballistic missile activities”. He was subsequently removed from the list in 2012 but put back on in 2021 on account of his work for the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) — an organisation directly controlled by the Supreme Leader. The US Treasury, which also sanctioned him in 2013, claims that EIKO controls “large swathes of the Iranian economy, including assets expropriated from political dissidents and religious minorities, to the benefit of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior Iranian government officials.” Raisi’s immediate successor is thus cut from the same hardliner cloth — though his skills seem to lean toward stealing more than outright mass murder.
Raisi was a senior figure in the regime, but ultimately it was Khamenei who still ruled. His death is a destabilising event, but likely not a hugely significant one. This fact is clear from much of the regime’s rhetoric yesterday. In an official statement, Khamenei said that “the Iranian nation has lost a sincere, devoted and valuable servant”. The Cabinet described him as “a hero and servant of the nation and a loyal companion to the leadership [Khamenei]”, but critically added that there would not be the slightest disruption to the country’s management.
The regime also seems keen to stamp out rumours and conspiracy theory. While assorted nutters online are blaming the Israelis, a State-run news agency posted that the crash was due to a “technical failure”. This is almost certainly true: Raisi was travelling on a helicopter bought by the previous regime in the Seventies, part of a fleet that Iran had been unable to upgrade due to US sanctions on the aviation industry. Former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif duly blamed the US for Raisi’s death: “[The US] has sanctioned the sale of airplane and aviation parts to Iran and does not allow the Iranian people to enjoy aviation rights,” he said. “These will be recorded in the list of America’s crimes against the Iranian people”.
There you have it. An accident, though a happy one. If Karma does exist — and I have seen enough of geopolitics to be pretty convinced it doesn’t — it found Ebrahim Raisi yesterday.
What now for Iran and the wider region? Well, internally, the regime will ensure that it’s business as usual. A suitably pliant – and hardline – figure will be elected in 50 days’ time. It’s likely to be an uninspiring occasion. The 2024 parliamentary elections witnessed an even lower turnout than Raisi’s election, of just 41% (and even that is likely to have been massaged to some degree).
Regionally and globally the picture is more mixed. The Israelis pay close attention to political changes inside Iran, especially abrupt ones like this. With Raisi gone, any potential opposition to Mojtaba’s succession is now bereft of at least a figurehead around which to congregate. Jerusalem can now expect a pretty seamless transfer of power among not just ideological bedfellows but within the same family. Khamenei’s world view will almost certainly continue to dominate Iranian political thinking, and this means no détente with the West, and a foreign policy based on aggressive adventurism and ideologically unyielding conflict with Israel.
Despite the death of Raisi and his foreign minister, Khamenei believes the West and its allies are weak and divided. There are no indications that Mojtaba believes any differently. With one of his closest allies now gone and his health failing, Khamenei, already paranoid, will double down when it comes to ensuring his legacy is in place. Forward defence, the basis of Tehran’s grand strategy, holds that the Islamic Republic, a revolutionary state, will never suffer having done to it what it did to the Shah. It will always fight abroad so it never has to fight within. And that is bad news, not just for those in Israel and beyond, but for those who would see a better future for the Iranian people too.
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Source: UnHerd Read the original article here: https://unherd.com/