For most of Lebanon’s modern history, the Assads have been as immovable as its mountains. As far back as 1976, early in the Lebanese Civil War, Hafez al-Assad ordered Syrian troops over the border. And there they remained, for 29 years, until his son, Bashar, finally called them home in 2005. Yet even then, these tall men with moustaches continued to cast a shadow over Beirut, influencing Lebanese politics and linking Hezbollah to its main Iranian sponsors.
But now, suddenly, the Assads are gone, scuttling off to Moscow in disgrace. The Syrian Arab Army, which had occupied Lebanon in some form for decades, and which had fought viciously against Syrian rebels for 14 long years, melted like the Lebanese snow in springtime, fatally weakened by violence and wrecked by pitiful salaries. Yet if this revolution obviously means the most to Damascus, Lebanese too could see their lives change. The end of the Assads, after all, leaves vast economic and political opportunities — if, that is, foreigners avoid meddling in Lebanon once more.
With Syria stumbling into a new era, Lebanese political leaders are struggling to grasp what that means for them: especially given they are already reeling from Israel’s assault on Hezbollah and the not-so-final ceasefire that followed. What they have done, at least, is bolster the country’s security, deploying more troops to the Syrian frontier. To quote the office of Najib Mikati, the Lebanese prime minister, his government is working to distance “Lebanon from the repercussions of the developments in Syria”.
In practice, of course, that’s impossible. Assad may be gone, but Lebanon remains joined at the hip to Syria, just as it always has. Certainly, that’s clear when it comes to Hezbollah. As the militia itself has apparently conceded, Assad’s demise represents a “dangerous” new transformation both for Syria and itself. To understand this, you only need to look at a map. Though it was created as an Iranian proxy, Hassan Nasrallah’s former group always needed help from Syria, with the Assads representing a logistical bridge from Tehran to Beirut. The rebel takeover in Damascus has decisively severed this link, and though Iran may still funnel weapons to Hezbollah by sea, it’ll no longer be able to provide the heavy equipment that made the group so formidable.
Nor do the consequences for Hezbollah end there. As the Syrian economy crumbled, the Assad regime effectively became a narcostate, financing both itself and Hezbollah through the captagon trade. Now though, that funding has gone, even as the ceasefire with Israel has squeezed the group north of the Litani River. Dovetailed with persistant IDF strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure, and the group is weaker than ever, especially when you recall that forces hostile to Hezbollah surround Lebanon on three sides. Even the militia itself has begun to see the light, releasing a statement saying it “supported” the aspirations of the Syrian people — a ludicrous claim after helping Assad butcher civilians for years.
Where Hezbollah falls, meanwhile, other forces may rise to take its place. Already, there are signs that Lebanese heavyweights outside the militia’s circle are breathing more freely. Consider Walid Jumblatt. The leader of the Druze, his father was assassinated by Syrian operatives during the Lebanese Civil War. And though Walid himself remained deferential to Assad for much of the last decade, he nonetheless welcomed the dictator’s expulsion. As he wrote after the regime’s collapse: “I greet the Syrian people after a long wait.” He isn’t alone. Gebran Bassil, a Lebanese Christian politician, recently stated that Hezbollah should now focus on domestic affairs, and end its adventures abroad.
Whether this more open atmosphere translates into action will become clearer as Lebanon approaches its presidential vote on 9 January, with lawmakers hoping they can finally appoint a head of state after two years of gridlock. The Americans, for their part, see an opportunity here too: Washington is pushing the Lebanese parliament to appoint a president not aligned with Hezbollah. For the first time in years, this seems possible. One obvious candidate would be Joseph Aoun, the head of the Lebanese Armed Forces. And though his election is far from guaranteed, Aoun’s ascension to the presidency would be a major blow to Hezbollah’s influence at the top of Lebanon’s politics.
Beyond the parlour games in Beirut, the fall of Assad could soon have vast consequences for the Lebanese themselves. No longer running the risk of an extended stay at Sednaya, many of the million or so Syrian refugees in Lebanon will return home. Their departure will transform Lebanon’s embattled economy, creating much-needed work for locals while throwing industries like agriculture into crisis. For a large segment of the Lebanese political establishment Syrians as a group have long been a convenient political scapegoat, unfairly blamed for political murders and the country’s economic crisis. Their return home won’t solve Lebanon’s problems — but may remove a lightning rod social issue from Lebanese discourse, helping mitigate social tensions at a time of unprecedented uncertainty.
Much could still go wrong. With Hezbollah weakened, and Assad gone, Lebanon’s sectarian politicians are now likely to compete among each other for power. That, it goes without saying, could potentially usher in more instability, or even actual bloodshed. That’s what happened back in 2008, when Hezbollah’s rivals tried to constrain the group following an earlier war with Israel. More to the point, there are plenty of factions ready to take Hezbollah’s place. One is the Amal Movement, another Shi’a organisation, others, such as Christian groups like the Lebanese Forces, could jockey for position too.
Nor are Lebanon’s internal dynamics the only worry here: with Israel one obvious fly in the ointment. In an ideal Middle East, Hezbollah’s growing isolation would encourage the Jewish State to sit back, allowing its old foe to founder. But given the upheaval in Syria, Israel may decide that now is the time to destroy Hezbollah once and for all.
Israeli behaviour certainly seems aggressive. Netanyahu’s first impulse following the rebel takeover of Damascus was to attack Syrian weapons depots, preventing them from falling into militant hands. No less striking, Netanyahu has “temporarily” moved his troops beyond the Golan Heights, illegally annexed by Israel in 1981 — and into Syria proper. The prime minister justified this move by pointing to the collapse of a border security agreement Israel had signed with the Assads back in 1974. Be that as it may, with the IDF’s capture of the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, the tallest peak for miles, Israel has gained a strategic point from which to monitor both southern Syria and Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Lebanon. If Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah indeed restarts in the coming months, both Syrians and Lebanese may find themselves dragged into the quagmire once more.
The new Syria could also cause more direct problems for Lebanon. Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) leader, is presenting himself and his forces as moderate Islamists interested in preserving a genuinely pluralistic Syria, but it’s unclear if he’ll stick to this agenda. Though HTS seems unwilling to launch incursions into Lebanon for now, a resurgent Hezbollah could change that. No less worrying, HTS has form here. Under its former guise of Jabhat al-Nusra, it launched several forays across the border. The Syrian war even sparked a micro-conflict in the Lebanese city of Tripoli, where Sunni militias fought their Shi’a rivals for years.
An Islamist regime in Damascus, then, could quickly reopen Lebanon’s own religious wounds. And that’s not the only Syria threat. Between Syrian Kurdish forces, clashing with groups backed Turkey, to the competing foreign ties of other rebel factions, renewed violence is likely. And as reports now emerge of pro-Assad Syrians fleeing over the border to Lebanon, there’s a risk that Beirut gets dragged back into its neighbour’s political fights — especially if the new rulers in Damascus choose to hunt down their newly exiled enemies.
As with so much else in the Levant right now, it’s too early to know how things will go. Yet Lebanon now faces its most significant movement of flux since the end of the civil war in 1990. With Iran and Hezbollah on the decline, the US resurgent, and the Gulf States and Turkey poised to return to Lebanese politics, there’s plenty to play for. Let’s just hope the country’s long-suffering citizens don’t yet again lose to other peoples’ games.
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Source: UnHerd Read the original article here: https://unherd.com/